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Security

Event ID 4670: Object permissions changed

Permissions on an object were changedSecurity event 4670 records a change to an object's permissions (DACL or owner), with old and new security descriptors in SDDL and the process responsible.
4670
Event ID
4670
Channel
Security
Provider
Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing
Log file
Security.evtx
Category
Object access
Default logging
Needs configuration

What event 4670 means

Event 4670 is written when the permissions of a file, folder, registry key or security token object change. It carries both the previous (OldSd) and new (NewSd) security descriptors as SDDL strings, so the exact change can be reconstructed: which ACE was added or removed, and whether the owner moved.

For files and registry keys it depends on the object's SACL: file objects need Change Permissions and/or Take Ownership audited, registry keys need Write DAC and/or Write Owner. SACL changes are not covered here; they produce 4907.

Permission changes are a quiet but important signal: attackers grant themselves access to protected data or binaries, and ransomware or cleanup scripts sometimes reset ACLs before acting.

When it is logged

Audit policy / configuration

Advanced Audit Policy Configuration > Object Access > Audit File System or Audit Registry (Success) with a SACL auditing permission or ownership changes; token object changes fall under Policy Change > Audit Authorization Policy Change or Audit Authentication Policy Change.

Microsoft lists four subcategories that can generate 4670. Token-related records can be frequent and are rarely interesting; focus on file and registry objects.

Key fields

FieldWhat it tells you
SubjectUserNameAccount that changed the permissions.
SubjectLogonIdLogon session of that account.
ObjectServerSubsystem, normally Security.
ObjectTypeFile, Key or Token, for example.
ObjectNamePath of the file, folder or registry key whose permissions changed.
HandleIdHandle used for the change.
OldSdPrevious security descriptor in SDDL (owner O:, group G:, DACL D:).
NewSdNew security descriptor in SDDL. Compare it with OldSd; a new (A;;FA;;;WD) style ACE granting Everyone (WD) full access is a typical red flag.
ProcessNameProcess that made the change, e.g. icacls.exe, explorer.exe or powershell.exe.
ProcessIdHexadecimal PID of that process.

Common benign sources

  • Administrators adjusting folder permissions through Explorer or icacls.
  • Installers and Windows servicing setting ACLs on program and system files.
  • Applications creating per-user folders and setting their own permissions.

What attackers do that produces it

  • Granting a controlled account full control on sensitive files, shares or service binaries.
  • Taking ownership of system files or registry keys to replace or modify them.
  • Opening permissions on a folder (e.g. Everyone full control) to stage or share data.

Investigation tips

  • Diff OldSd and NewSd; identify the SIDs gained or lost and the rights they carry.
  • Check ProcessName and pivot SubjectLogonId to 4688 to get the exact command line.
  • Look for 4663 records on the same object shortly after, showing use of the new access.

MITRE ATT&CK techniques

TechniqueTactics
T1222.001 File and Directory Permissions Modification: Windows PermissionsDefense Impairment

MITRE ATT&CK v19.2. Technique and tactic names are MITRE's.

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Sources and further reading