Event ID 4670: Object permissions changed
- Event ID
- 4670
- Channel
- Security
- Provider
- Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing
- Log file
- Security.evtx
- Category
- Object access
- Default logging
- Needs configuration
What event 4670 means
Event 4670 is written when the permissions of a file, folder, registry key or security token object change. It carries both the previous (OldSd) and new (NewSd) security descriptors as SDDL strings, so the exact change can be reconstructed: which ACE was added or removed, and whether the owner moved.
For files and registry keys it depends on the object's SACL: file objects need Change Permissions and/or Take Ownership audited, registry keys need Write DAC and/or Write Owner. SACL changes are not covered here; they produce 4907.
Permission changes are a quiet but important signal: attackers grant themselves access to protected data or binaries, and ransomware or cleanup scripts sometimes reset ACLs before acting.
When it is logged
Advanced Audit Policy Configuration > Object Access > Audit File System or Audit Registry (Success) with a SACL auditing permission or ownership changes; token object changes fall under Policy Change > Audit Authorization Policy Change or Audit Authentication Policy Change.
Microsoft lists four subcategories that can generate 4670. Token-related records can be frequent and are rarely interesting; focus on file and registry objects.
Key fields
| Field | What it tells you |
|---|---|
| SubjectUserName | Account that changed the permissions. |
| SubjectLogonId | Logon session of that account. |
| ObjectServer | Subsystem, normally Security. |
| ObjectType | File, Key or Token, for example. |
| ObjectName | Path of the file, folder or registry key whose permissions changed. |
| HandleId | Handle used for the change. |
| OldSd | Previous security descriptor in SDDL (owner O:, group G:, DACL D:). |
| NewSd | New security descriptor in SDDL. Compare it with OldSd; a new (A;;FA;;;WD) style ACE granting Everyone (WD) full access is a typical red flag. |
| ProcessName | Process that made the change, e.g. icacls.exe, explorer.exe or powershell.exe. |
| ProcessId | Hexadecimal PID of that process. |
Common benign sources
- Administrators adjusting folder permissions through Explorer or
icacls. - Installers and Windows servicing setting ACLs on program and system files.
- Applications creating per-user folders and setting their own permissions.
What attackers do that produces it
- Granting a controlled account full control on sensitive files, shares or service binaries.
- Taking ownership of system files or registry keys to replace or modify them.
- Opening permissions on a folder (e.g. Everyone full control) to stage or share data.
Investigation tips
- Diff
OldSdandNewSd; identify the SIDs gained or lost and the rights they carry. - Check
ProcessNameand pivotSubjectLogonIdto 4688 to get the exact command line. - Look for 4663 records on the same object shortly after, showing use of the new access.
MITRE ATT&CK techniques
| Technique | Tactics |
|---|---|
| T1222.001 File and Directory Permissions Modification: Windows Permissions | Defense Impairment |
MITRE ATT&CK v19.2. Technique and tactic names are MITRE's.
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